How Populism and Polarization Affect Europe’s Liberal Democracies by Schulze, Heidi et al.
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 1–5
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i3.3460
Editorial
How Populism and Polarization Affect Europe’s Liberal Democracies
Heidi Schulze 1,*, Marlene Mauk 1 and Jonas Linde 2
1 GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 50667 Cologne, Germany; E-Mails: heidi.schulze@gesis.org (H.S.),
marlene.mauk@gesis.org (M.M.)
2 Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, 5020 Bergen, Norway; E-Mail: jonas.linde@uib.no
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 10 July 2020 | Published: 17 July 2020
Abstract
In recent years, two phenomena have put Europe’s liberal democracies under strain: populism and polarization. The rise of
populist parties, the increasing radicalization of publics and political discourse, as well as the expansion of hyperpartisan
media have caused concern amongobservers and citizens alike.While lively academic discussions have revolved around the
causes of these phenomena, research regarding their real-world consequences has been sparse. This thematic issue wants
to address this gap in the literature and contribute to developing strategies for mitigating potential threats populism and
polarization may pose to liberal democracies. To this end, it examines how populism and polarization affect citizens across
Europe. It links research on audiences of hyperpartisan media with work on elite-induced polarization, populist concep-
tions of democracy, election results and support for the democratic system, and policy-making by populist governments.
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In recent years, European liberal democracies have in-
creasingly come under strain. In particular, the rise of
populist and sometimes radical parties, increasing polit-
ical polarization and radicalization of publics and polit-
ical discourse, and the expansion of alternative, hyper-
partisan news media fostering antagonism and propa-
gating ideas incompatible with liberal democracy have
been cause for concern. With countries such as Poland
and Hungary already exhibiting manifest democratic re-
cessions (Lührmann, Grahn, Morgan, Pillai, & Lindberg,
2019; Lührmann et al., 2018), scientific and public dis-
course alike have mainly revolved around two wor-
rying phenomena that may endanger the stability of
democracy: populism and polarization (see Inglehart &
Norris, 2017).
Across Europe, predominantly right-wing populist
parties have not only entered national and regional
parliaments but also begun exercising executive power
in various governments, often dominating the political
discourse in their respective countries (Mudde, 2016;
Rooduijn, 2015). With radical-right and, to a lesser ex-
tent, radical-left populist parties advocating extreme
policy positions and, at the same time, nourishing dis-
trust toward traditional parties and media, both par-
ties and voters have become increasingly polarized, and
divisions between political camps appear to be grow-
ing deeper (Galston, 2018; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015).
These trends seem to be fueled, in part, by digital com-
munication: Populist actors use online media very effi-
ciently to spread their messages (Engesser, Ernst, Esser,
& Büchel, 2017; Gerbaudo, 2017; Stier, Posch, Bleier, &
Strohmaier, 2017), and (hyper-)partisan media reinforce
populist, radical, and anti-democratic ideas through rep-
etition across various online networks and social media
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 1–5 1
platforms (Prior, 2013; Starbird, 2017). These develop-
ments beg the question, how are these changes affect-
ing societies and the liberal democratic order? In partic-
ular, are populism and polarization serious threats to lib-
eral democracy?
Populism, on the one hand, can be defined as:
An ideology that considers society to be ultimately
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic
groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’
and which argues that politics should be an expres-
sion of the volonté générale (general will) of the peo-
ple. (Mudde, 2004, p. 543)
Thus, in itself, it may not necessarily be seen as a threat
to democracy (Canovan, 1999). However, populist par-
ties typically adopt either a radical-right or radical-left
host ideology, criticizing liberal democratic procedures
and furthering the political polarization of both the party
system and the public. Even more importantly, by styliz-
ing ‘the people’ as a homogeneous group, populism not
only rejects the idea of counter-majoritarian institutions,
such as minority rights, but is in itself inherently anti-
pluralistic, challenging the very core of liberal democracy
(Galston, 2018; Müller, 2016; Pappas, 2019).
Polarization, on the other hand, is defined as either
the state or the process of opinions being or becoming
more opposed (DiMaggio, Evans, & Bryson, 1996, p. 693).
Given this definition, polarization might not necessarily
be seen as a threat to democracy. After all, a plurality of
political views is one of the hallmarks of liberal democ-
racy (cf. Dahl, 1989). However, if polarization becomes
too extreme, it is likely to result in social and political
conflict, making political compromise, let alone consen-
sus, almost impossible, thereby hindering the smooth
functioning of the democratic political system (DiMaggio
et al., 1996; Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015; Iyengar,
Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra, & Westwood, 2019). Both
populism and polarization can thus be considered seri-
ous threats to the liberal democratic order established
in Europe after World War II.
From a normative liberal democratic point of view,
then, the electoral success of (right-wing) populist par-
ties critical of liberal democracy, and the political divi-
sion and radicalization of elites and publics are clearly
undesirable and alarming. Yet, while lively academic
discussions as well as public debates have revolved
around the causes of these phenomena (see, e.g., Doyle,
2011; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers,
2002; March & Rommerskirchen, 2014; Rooduijn, 2018;
Van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018; Visser, Lubbers,
Kraaykamp, & Jaspers, 2014), research regarding their
real-world consequences has been sparse. This thematic
issue addresses these potential threats by examining
how populism and polarization affect citizens across
Europe. Ordinary citizens and their attitudes toward
the political system are central ingredients of a sta-
ble and well-functioning democracy (e.g., Easton, 1965;
Hetherington, 1998). As long as citizens’ support for the
present political system—liberal democracy—remains
high even in light of increasing populism and polariza-
tion, we have reason to be optimistic about the future:
Populist and radical parties should not be able to disman-
tle democracy easily against the will of the public. The
contributions in this thematic issue therefore focus on
how ordinary citizens react to populism and polarization
and aim to identify the conditions under which populism
and polarization exert their least detrimental effects on
citizens’ attitudes.
To this end, Schulze (2020) focuses on the role of on-
line news media as drivers of radical-right populist atti-
tudes and explores the characteristics of the audiences
of right-wing alternative online media, also referred to
as hyperpartisan media. Drawing on the 2019 Reuters
Digital News Survey, Schulze presents a cross-national
analysis of right-wing alternative media use in Northern
and Central Europe. The analysis shows that political in-
terest and a critical stance toward immigration, accom-
panied by a skeptical assessment of news quality, in gen-
eral, and distrust—especially in public service broadcast-
ingmedia—aswell as the use of socialmedia as a primary
news source, function as the strongest predictors of al-
ternative online news consumption. Her findings suggest
that right-wing alternative online media should not be
dismissed as a peripheral phenomenon, but rather must
be considered as relevant multipliers and distributors
of populist narratives with high mobilizing and polariz-
ing potential.
Berntzen (2020) adds to the theme of this thematic
issue by studying the effects of political and norma-
tive conflicts initiated by populist radical-right parties.
More precisely, he investigates whether and to what ex-
tent voters are affected by attacks of populist radical-
right parties on their political opponents. To differenti-
ate between authoritarian and non-authoritarian voters,
the four-item child rearing values index measure of au-
thoritarian predispositions is employed. Using a survey-
based experimental design that relies on data from the
Norwegian Citizen Panel, Berntzen shows that authori-
tarian and non-authoritarian voters simultaneously re-
spond to high-intensity political conflict. From the analy-
ses, he concludes that conflict initiated by populist
radical-right parties functions as a driver of personality-
based, affective sorting of citizens and thus contributes
to polarization.
Making a novel contribution to the burgeoning re-
search on how the continuous success of populist par-
ties affects public notions of democracy, Heinisch and
Wegscheider (2020) deal with the tension between pop-
ulism and democracy. Drawing on survey data from
Austria and Germany, they provide an empirical analy-
sis of how different types of populist attitudes and four
types of democratic decision-making interact. Taking into
account that populism is often attached to a radical-
right or radical-left host ideology, their findings show
that populism and radical host ideologies tap into dif-
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ferent dimensions of democracy. Populist attitudes are
associated with negative views toward representative
democracy and pluralism,while support formajority rule
and deliberative procedures are shaped by the radical-
right and radical-left host ideologies. Interestingly, and
perhaps somewhat surprising, populists favor decision-
making based on the general will of the people (anti-
pluralism), while at the same time are not very attracted
to strict majority rule and restriction of minority rights
(which, on the other hand, are attractive to people with
nativist and authoritarian attitudes).
Turning to the effects of the rise of populist parties
on citizen attitudes, Mauk (2020) analyzes how the elec-
toral success of populist parties affects European citizens’
trust in core democratic institutions. Diverging from the
individual-level literature, which shows a negative rela-
tionship between populist party support and political
trust, she suggests that macro-level populist party suc-
cess may increase political trust among the general pub-
lic. She further proposes, as well as demonstrates empir-
ically for 23 European democracies, that this corrective-
force effect is particularly pronounced in democracies
that do actually lend themselves to populist criticism:
The electoral success of populist parties only leads to
increased citizen trust in countries with deficient demo-
cratic quality, weak corruption control, and meagre eco-
nomic performance. In countries with high democratic
quality, effective corruption control, and high economic
performance, in contrast, populist party success has no
substantive effect on political trust.
Building on the well-established finding that citizens
who voted for the winning camp express higher satisfac-
tion with democracy than those who voted for the losing
camp, Nemčok (2020) examines how big of a boost in sat-
isfaction with democracy election winners experience,
and whether the size of this boost is conditional on party
characteristics. Utilizing 17 surveys from 13 European
countries inwhich an election resulted in a change in gov-
ernment, Nemčok shows that differences in party vote
shares and voters’ feelings of closeness to a party have
only negligible effects on the boost experienced by elec-
tion winners. However, his results also demonstrate that
voters who feel close to a particular party are gener-
ally more satisfied with democracy than those without
a party affiliation, regardless of whether their party won
the election or not. This latter finding relates to Mauk’s
contribution in that it points to the observation that citi-
zens seeing their preferences as represented within the
political system can increase their support for the demo-
cratic system. Both studies promote the idea that per-
ceived or actual representation of citizens’ preferences
can help reconcile them with democracy, and thereby
indicate a potential avenue for (re-)integrating populist
and radical citizens into the political system.
Concluding the thematic issue, Bartha, Boda, and
Szikra (2020) take a look at populists in government. An
increasing number of studies have set out to investigate
the policy effects of governments that include populist
parties. In their article, “When Populist Leaders Govern:
Conceptualising Populism in Policy Making,” they pro-
vide an analysis of policy-making by the first populist
radical-right majority government in Europe—the Fidesz
government in Hungary. The authors construct an ideal
type of populist policy-making and use congruence ana-
lysis to investigate to what extent social policy in post-
2010 Hungary (2010–2018) conformswith the ideal type.
Focusing on policy content, process, and discourse, they
find a strong degree of congruence between the policy-
making patterns of the Orbán government and the ideal
type of populist policy-making.
Overall, the contributions paint a multifaceted pic-
ture of how populism and polarization affect European
liberal democracies. On the one hand, fueled by digital
media, European societies are in danger of becoming in-
creasingly populist and polarized, and this development
is accompanied by attitudes and conceptions challenging
to liberal democracies. On the other hand, the represen-
tation of populist parties within the political system can
help mitigate citizens’ disenchantment with the liberal
democratic system. In the end, populism and polariza-
tion come with numerous detrimental by-products: the
brutalization of political debate, the spread of disinfor-
mation, and, not least, an increased propensity to vio-
lence against ‘the other,’ which are only the most obvi-
ous problems. More fundamental changes in citizen per-
ceptions of and attitudes toward liberal democracy may
additionally lead to a turning away from the hard-earned
achievements of modern democracies: minority rights,
rule of law, and separation of powers.
Acknowledgments
This thematic issue was accompanied by the 5th
EUROLAB Authors’ Conference in Cologne, titled “Pop-
ulism and Polarization: A Dual Threat to Europe’s Democ-
racies?” The majority of the articles published in this
thematic issue were presented and discussed during
this conference. We would like to thank all authors, re-
viewers, and discussants who contributed to the con-
ference and this thematic issue, as well as the Fritz
Thyssen Foundation for their generous financial support
of the conference.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Bartha, A., Boda, Z., & Szikra, D. (2020). When populist
leaders govern: Conceptualising populism in policy
making. Politics and Governance, 8(3), 71–81.
Berntzen, L. E. (2020). How elite politicization of terror
impacts sympathies for partisans: Radical right ver-
sus social democrats. Politics and Governance, 8(3),
19–31.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 1–5 3
Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the
two faces of democracy. Political Studies, 47(1), 2–16.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00184
Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and its critics. New Haven,
CT, and London: Yale University Press.
DiMaggio, P., Evans, J., & Bryson, B. (1996). Have Ameri-
can’s social attitudes become more polarized? Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology, 102(3), 690–755. https://
doi.org/10.1086/230995
Doyle, D. (2011). The legitimacy of political institutions.
Comparative Political Studies, 44(11), 1447–1473.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011407469
Easton, D. (1965). A systems analysis of political life. New
York, NY: Wiley.
Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser, F., & Büchel, F. (2017). Pop-
ulism and social media: How politicians spread a frag-
mented ideology. Information, Communication &
Society, 20(8), 1109–1126. https://doi.org/10.1080/
1369118X.2016.1207697
Galston, W. A. (2018). The populist challenge to lib-
eral democracy. Journal of Democracy, 29(2), 5–19.
https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0020
Gerbaudo, P. (2017). Social media and populism: An
elective affinity? Media, Culture & Society, 40(5),
745–753. https://doi.org/10.1177/01634437187721
92
Heinisch, R., & Wegscheider, C. (2020). Disentangling
how populism and radical host ideologies shape cit-
izens’ conceptions of democratic decision-making.
Politics and Governance, 8(3), 32–44.
Hetherington, M. J. (1998). The political relevance of po-
litical trust. The American Political Science Review,
92(4), 791–808. https://doi.org/10.2307/2586304
Hetherington, M. J., & Rudolph, T. J. (2015). Why Wash-
ington won’t work. Chicago, IL, and London: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2017). Trump and the populist
authoritarian parties: The silent revolution in reverse.
Perspectives on Politics, 15(2), 443–454. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S1537592717000111
Ivarsflaten, E. (2008). What unites right-wing pop-
ulists in Western Europe? Comparative Political
Studies, 41(1), 3–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0010414006294168
Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N.,
& Westwood, S. J. (2019). The origins and conse-
quences of affective polarization in the United States.
Annual Review of Political Science, 22(1), 129–146.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-
073034
Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and loathing
across party lines: New evidence on group polar-
ization. American Journal of Political Science, 59(3),
690–707. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12152
Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M., & Scheepers, P. (2002). Ex-
treme right-wing voting in Western Europe. Euro-
pean Journal of Political Research, 41(3), 345–378.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00015
Lührmann, A., Grahn, S., Morgan, R., Pillai, S., &
Lindberg, S. I. (2019). State of the world 2018:
Democracy facing global challenges. Democrati-
zation, 26(6), 895–915. https://doi.org/10.1080/
13510347.2019.1613980
Lührmann, A., Mechkova, V., Dahlum, S., Maxwell, L.,
Olin,M., Petrarca, C. S., . . . Lindberg, S. I. (2018). State
of the world 2017: Autocratization and exclusion?
Democratization, 25(8), 1321–1340. https://doi.org/
10.1080/13510347.2018.1479693
March, L., & Rommerskirchen, C. (2014). Out of left field?
Explaining the variable electoral success of Euro-
pean radical left parties. Party Politics, 21(1), 40–53.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812462929
Mauk, M. (2020). Rebuilding trust in broken systems?
Populist party success and citizens’ trust in demo-
cratic institutions. Politics and Governance, 8(3),
45–58.
Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government
and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/
10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x
Mudde, C. (2016). Europe’s populist surge: A long time in
the making. Foreign Affairs, 95(6), 25–30.
Müller, J.-W. (2016).What is populism? Philadelphia, PA:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Nemčok, M. (2020). The effect of parties on voters’ satis-
faction with democracy: Evidence from discontinuity
design applied to European social survey. Politics and
Governance, 8(3), 59–70.
Pappas, T. S. (2019). Populism and liberal democracy: A
comparative and theoretical analysis. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Prior, M. (2013). Media and political polarization. Annual
Review of Political Science, 16(1), 101–127. https://
doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135242
Rooduijn, M. (2015). The rise of the populist radical
right in Western Europe. European View, 14(1), 3–11.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-015-0347-5
Rooduijn, M. (2018). What unites the voter bases
of populist parties? Comparing the electorates
of 15 populist parties. European Political Science
Review, 10(3), 351–368. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1755773917000145
Schulze, H. (2020). Who uses right-wing alternative on-
line media? An Exploration of audience characteris-
tics. Politics and Governance, 8(3), 6–18.
Starbird, K. (2017). Examining the alternative media
ecosystem through the production of alternative nar-
ratives of mass shooting events on Twitter. In Pro-
ceedings of the Eleventh International AAAI Confer-
ence on Web and Social Media (pp. 230-239). Palo
Alto, CA: AAAI Press. Retrieved from https://www.
aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM17/paper/
viewPaper/15603
Stier, S., Posch, L., Bleier, A., & Strohmaier, M. (2017).
When populists become popular: Comparing Face-
book use by the right-wing movement pegida and
german political parties. Information, Communica-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 1–5 4
tion & Society, 20(9), 1365–1388. https://doi.org/
10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328519
Van Hauwaert, S. M., & van Kessel, S. (2018). Beyond
protest and discontent: A cross-national analysis of
the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions
on populist party support. European Journal of Politi-
cal Research, 57(1), 68–92. https://doi.org/10.1111/
1475-6765.12216
Visser, M., Lubbers, M., Kraaykamp, G., & Jaspers,
E. (2014). Support for radical left ideologies in
Europe. European Journal of Political Research,
53(3), 541–558. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.
12048
About the Authors
Heidi Schulze is a Doctoral Researcher at the Department of Media and Communication at LMUMunich (Germany) and a
Research Associate at GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. At LMU, she is part of the research lab of
Prof. Dr. Rieger and works in an interdisciplinary research project on online radicalization employing computational meth-
ods. In her thesis, Ms. Schulze studies characteristics and audiences of alternative online media and hyperpartisan
news websites.
Marlene Mauk is a Research Associate in political science at GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Cologne. She
holds a PhD in Comparative Politics from Mainz University. Her research interests lie in the field of political culture, with
a focus on the comparison between democracies and autocracies; among other topics, she studies political trust and its
sources, political value orientations, and various aspects of democratic quality. She is the Author of Citizen Support for
Democratic and Autocratic Regimes (2020, Oxford University Press).
Jonas Linde is Professor of Comparative Politics at University of Bergen, Norway. His research interests are within the fields
of political support, public opinion, comparative corruption, democratization, and post-communist politics. His research
has been published in journals such as European Journal of Political Research, Political Studies, Party Politics, The Journal
of Politics, Democratization, and Government and Opposition.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 1–5 5
